openstack/ironic
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minor changes to security documentation

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This contains some minor changes to the security documentation:
- replace 'ironic' with 'the Bare Metal service' (as per documentation
  guidelines
- fixes a few grammatical issues
- removes reference to "clean_nodes" configuration option since it
  has been deleted in Newton
- clarifies that [deploy]/erase_devices_priority cannot be 0 for
  erasing of devices to happen
- added links
- additional references shows reference descriptions instead of the links

Change-Id: I11df3bde9eff4b7f109bee6b9d0058e325b67027
This commit is contained in:
Ruby Loo 2016-05-24 12:38:56 -04:00
parent 430da755d9
commit ab8e689d33
1 changed files with 24 additions and 18 deletions
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42
doc/source/deploy/security.rst
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@ -7,14 +7,14 @@ Security
Overview
========
While Ironic is intended to be a secure application, it is important to
understand what it does and does not cover today.
While the Bare Metal service is intended to be a secure application, it is
important to understand what it does and does not cover today.
Deployers must properly evaluate their use case and take the appropriate
actions to secure their environment appropriately. This document is intended to
provide an overview of what risks and operator of Ironic should be aware of. It
is not intended as a How-To guide for securing a data center or an OpenStack
deployment.
provide an overview of what risks an operator of the Bare Metal service should
be aware of. It is not intended as a How-To guide for securing a data center
or an OpenStack deployment.
.. TODO: add "Security Considerations for Network Boot" section
@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ deployment.
Firmware security
=================
When ironic deploys an operating system image to a server, that image is run
natively on the server without virtualization. Any user with administrative
access to the deployed instance has administrative access to the underlying
hardware.
When the Bare Metal service deploys an operating system image to a server, that
image is run natively on the server without virtualization. Any user with
administrative access to the deployed instance has administrative access to
the underlying hardware.
Most servers' default settings do not prevent a privileged local user from
gaining direct access to hardware devices. Such a user could modify device or
@ -38,16 +38,17 @@ firmware settings, and potentially flash new firmware to the device, before
deleting their instance and allowing the server to be allocated to another
user.
If the ``automated_clean`` configuration option is enabled (previously the
``clean_nodes`` option), then Ironic will securely erase all local disk devices
within a machine during instance deletion. However, Ironic does not ship with
If the ``[conductor]/automated_clean`` configuration option is enabled (and
the ``[deploy]/erase_devices_priority`` configuration option is not zero),
the Bare Metal service will securely erase all local disk devices within a
machine during instance deletion. However, the service does not ship with
any code that will validate the integrity of, or make any modifications to,
system or device firmware or firmware settings.
Operators are encouraged to write their own hardware manager plugins for the
``ironic-python-agent`` ramdisk. This should include custom ``clean steps``
that would be run as part of Node de-provisioning. This should include custom
``clean steps`` to be run as part of the automated cleaning process, which
that would be run during the `automated cleaning`_ process, as part of Node
de-provisioning. The ``clean steps``
would perform the specific actions necessary within that environment to ensure
the integrity of each server's firmware.
@ -57,11 +58,16 @@ include:
- installing signed firmware for BIOS and peripheral devices
- using a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) to validate signatures at boot time
- booting machines in UEFI SecureBoot mode, rather than BIOS mode, to validate
kernel signatures
- booting machines in `UEFI Secure Boot mode`_, rather than BIOS mode, to
validate kernel signatures
- disabling local (in-band) access from the host OS to the management controller (BMC)
- disabling modifications to boot settings from the host OS
Additional references:
- http://docs.openstack.org/developer/ironic/deploy/install-guide.html?highlight=txt#trusted-boot-with-partition-image
- http://docs.openstack.org/developer/ironic/drivers/ilo.html?highlight=secure%20boot#uefi-secure-boot-support
- `automated cleaning`_
- `trusted boot with partition image`_
- `UEFI Secure Boot mode`_
.. _automated cleaning: http://docs.openstack.org/developer/ironic/deploy/cleaning.html#automated-cleaning
.. _trusted boot with partition image: http://docs.openstack.org/developer/ironic/deploy/install-guide.html?highlight=txt#trusted-boot-with-partition-image
.. _UEFI Secure Boot mode: http://docs.openstack.org/developer/ironic/drivers/ilo.html?highlight=secure%20boot#uefi-secure-boot-support