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# Copyright (c) 2013 - 2015 OpenStack Foundation
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or
# implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
import unittest
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from swift.common import utils
from swift.common.storage_policy import POLICIES
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
from swift.common.utils import Timestamp, md5
def write_diskfile(df, timestamp, data=b'test data', frag_index=None,
commit=True, legacy_durable=False, extra_metadata=None):
# Helper method to write some data and metadata to a diskfile.
# Optionally do not commit the diskfile, or commit but using a legacy
# durable file
with df.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
metadata = {
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
'ETag': md5(data, usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest(),
'X-Timestamp': timestamp.internal,
'Content-Length': str(len(data)),
}
if extra_metadata:
metadata.update(extra_metadata)
if frag_index is not None:
metadata['X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Frag-Index'] = str(frag_index)
writer.put(metadata)
if commit and legacy_durable:
# simulate legacy .durable file creation
durable_file = os.path.join(df._datadir,
timestamp.internal + '.durable')
with open(durable_file, 'wb'):
pass
elif commit:
writer.commit(timestamp)
# else: don't make it durable
return metadata
class BaseTest(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
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self.device = 'dev'
self.partition = '9'
self.tmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp()
# sender side setup
self.tx_testdir = os.path.join(self.tmpdir, 'tmp_test_ssync_sender')
utils.mkdirs(os.path.join(self.tx_testdir, self.device))
self.daemon_conf = {
'devices': self.tx_testdir,
'mount_check': 'false',
}
# daemon will be set in subclass setUp
self.daemon = None
def tearDown(self):
shutil.rmtree(self.tmpdir, ignore_errors=True)
def _make_diskfile(self, device='dev', partition='9',
account='a', container='c', obj='o', body='test',
extra_metadata=None, policy=None,
frag_index=None, timestamp=None, df_mgr=None,
commit=True, verify=True):
policy = policy or POLICIES.legacy
object_parts = account, container, obj
timestamp = Timestamp.now() if timestamp is None else timestamp
if df_mgr is None:
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df_mgr = self.daemon._df_router[policy]
df = df_mgr.get_diskfile(
device, partition, *object_parts, policy=policy,
frag_index=frag_index)
write_diskfile(df, timestamp, data=body, extra_metadata=extra_metadata,
commit=commit)
if commit and verify:
# when we write and commit stub data, sanity check it's readable
# and not quarantined because of any validation check
with df.open():
self.assertEqual(b''.join(df.reader()), body)
# sanity checks
listing = os.listdir(df._datadir)
self.assertTrue(listing)
for filename in listing:
self.assertTrue(filename.startswith(timestamp.internal))
return df
def _make_open_diskfile(self, device='dev', partition='9',
account='a', container='c', obj='o', body=b'test',
extra_metadata=None, policy=None,
frag_index=None, timestamp=None, df_mgr=None):
df = self._make_diskfile(device, partition, account, container, obj,
body, extra_metadata, policy, frag_index,
timestamp, df_mgr)
df.open()
return df