swift/test/unit/obj/test_auditor.py

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# Copyright (c) 2010-2012 OpenStack Foundation
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#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or
# implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
import unittest
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
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import json
import mock
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import os
import signal
import string
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
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import sys
import time
import xattr
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from shutil import rmtree
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from tempfile import mkdtemp
import textwrap
from os.path import dirname, basename
from test import BaseTestCase
from test.debug_logger import debug_logger
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
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from test.unit import (
DEFAULT_TEST_EC_TYPE, make_timestamp_iter, patch_policies,
skip_if_no_xattrs)
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
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from test.unit.obj.common import write_diskfile
from swift.obj import auditor, replicator
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
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from swift.obj.watchers.dark_data import DarkDataWatcher
from swift.obj.diskfile import (
DiskFile, write_metadata, invalidate_hash, get_data_dir,
DiskFileManager, ECDiskFileManager, AuditLocation, clear_auditor_status,
get_auditor_status, HASH_FILE, HASH_INVALIDATIONS_FILE)
from swift.common.exceptions import ClientException
from swift.common.utils import (
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
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mkdirs, normalize_timestamp, Timestamp, readconf, md5, PrefixLoggerAdapter)
from swift.common.storage_policy import (
ECStoragePolicy, StoragePolicy, POLICIES, EC_POLICY)
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_mocked_policies = [
StoragePolicy(0, 'zero', False),
StoragePolicy(1, 'one', True),
ECStoragePolicy(2, 'two', ec_type=DEFAULT_TEST_EC_TYPE,
ec_ndata=2, ec_nparity=1, ec_segment_size=4096),
]
def works_only_once(callable_thing, exception):
called = [False]
def only_once(*a, **kw):
if called[0]:
raise exception
else:
called[0] = True
return callable_thing(*a, **kw)
return only_once
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
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class FakeRing1(object):
def __init__(self, swift_dir, ring_name=None):
return
def get_nodes(self, *args, **kwargs):
x = 1
node1 = {'ip': '10.0.0.%s' % x,
'replication_ip': '10.0.0.%s' % x,
'port': 6200 + x,
'replication_port': 6200 + x,
'device': 'sda',
'zone': x % 3,
'region': x % 2,
'id': x,
'handoff_index': 1}
return (1, [node1])
class FakeRing2(object):
def __init__(self, swift_dir, ring_name=None):
return
def get_nodes(self, *args, **kwargs):
nodes = []
for x in [1, 2]:
nodes.append({'ip': '10.0.0.%s' % x,
'replication_ip': '10.0.0.%s' % x,
'port': 6200 + x,
'replication_port': 6200 + x,
'device': 'sda',
'zone': x % 3,
'region': x % 2,
'id': x,
'handoff_index': 1})
return (1, nodes)
class TestAuditorBase(BaseTestCase):
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def setUp(self):
Add checksum to object extended attributes Currently, our integrity checking for objects is pretty weak when it comes to object metadata. If the extended attributes on a .data or .meta file get corrupted in such a way that we can still unpickle it, we don't have anything that detects that. This could be especially bad with encrypted etags; if the encrypted etag (X-Object-Sysmeta-Crypto-Etag or whatever it is) gets some bits flipped, then we'll cheerfully decrypt the cipherjunk into plainjunk, then send it to the client. Net effect is that the client sees a GET response with an ETag that doesn't match the MD5 of the object *and* Swift has no way of detecting and quarantining this object. Note that, with an unencrypted object, if the ETag metadatum gets mangled, then the object will be quarantined by the object server or auditor, whichever notices first. As part of this commit, I also ripped out some mocking of getxattr/setxattr in tests. It appears to be there to allow unit tests to run on systems where /tmp doesn't support xattrs. However, since the mock is keyed off of inode number and inode numbers get re-used, there's lots of leakage between different test runs. On a real FS, unlinking a file and then creating a new one of the same name will also reset the xattrs; this isn't the case with the mock. The mock was pretty old; Ubuntu 12.04 and up all support xattrs in /tmp, and recent Red Hat / CentOS releases do too. The xattr mock was added in 2011; maybe it was to support Ubuntu Lucid Lynx? Bonus: now you can pause a test with the debugger, inspect its files in /tmp, and actually see the xattrs along with the data. Since this patch now uses a real filesystem for testing filesystem operations, tests are skipped if the underlying filesystem does not support setting xattrs (eg tmpfs or more than 4k of xattrs on ext4). References to "/tmp" have been replaced with calls to tempfile.gettempdir(). This will allow setting the TMPDIR envvar in test setup and getting an XFS filesystem instead of ext4 or tmpfs. THIS PATCH SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGES TESTING ENVIRONMENTS With this patch, every test environment will require TMPDIR to be using a filesystem that supports at least 4k of extended attributes. Neither ext4 nor tempfs support this. XFS is recommended. So why all the SkipTests? Why not simply raise an error? We still need the tests to run on the base image for OpenStack's CI system. Since we were previously mocking out xattr, there wasn't a problem, but we also weren't actually testing anything. This patch adds functionality to validate xattr data, so we need to drop the mock. `test.unit.skip_if_no_xattrs()` is also imported into `test.functional` so that functional tests can import it from the functional test namespace. The related OpenStack CI infrastructure changes are made in https://review.openstack.org/#/c/394600/. Co-Authored-By: John Dickinson <me@not.mn> Change-Id: I98a37c0d451f4960b7a12f648e4405c6c6716808
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skip_if_no_xattrs()
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self.testdir = os.path.join(mkdtemp(), 'tmp_test_object_auditor')
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self.devices = os.path.join(self.testdir, 'node')
self.rcache = os.path.join(self.testdir, 'object.recon')
self.logger = debug_logger()
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rmtree(self.testdir, ignore_errors=1)
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mkdirs(os.path.join(self.devices, 'sda'))
os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.devices, 'sdb'))
# policy 0
self.objects = os.path.join(self.devices, 'sda',
get_data_dir(POLICIES[0]))
self.objects_2 = os.path.join(self.devices, 'sdb',
get_data_dir(POLICIES[0]))
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os.mkdir(self.objects)
# policy 1
self.objects_p1 = os.path.join(self.devices, 'sda',
get_data_dir(POLICIES[1]))
self.objects_2_p1 = os.path.join(self.devices, 'sdb',
get_data_dir(POLICIES[1]))
os.mkdir(self.objects_p1)
# policy 2
self.objects_p2 = os.path.join(self.devices, 'sda',
get_data_dir(POLICIES[2]))
self.objects_2_p2 = os.path.join(self.devices, 'sdb',
get_data_dir(POLICIES[2]))
os.mkdir(self.objects_p2)
self.parts = {}
self.parts_p1 = {}
self.parts_p2 = {}
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for part in ['0', '1', '2', '3']:
self.parts[part] = os.path.join(self.objects, part)
self.parts_p1[part] = os.path.join(self.objects_p1, part)
self.parts_p2[part] = os.path.join(self.objects_p2, part)
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os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.objects, part))
os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.objects_p1, part))
os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.objects_p2, part))
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self.conf = dict(
devices=self.devices,
mount_check='false',
object_size_stats='10,100,1024,10240')
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
self.df_mgr = DiskFileManager(self.conf, self.logger)
self.ec_df_mgr = ECDiskFileManager(self.conf, self.logger)
# diskfiles for policy 0, 1, 2
self.disk_file = self.df_mgr.get_diskfile('sda', '0', 'a', 'c', 'o',
policy=POLICIES[0])
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
self.disk_file_p1 = self.df_mgr.get_diskfile('sda', '0', 'a', 'c2',
'o', policy=POLICIES[1])
self.disk_file_ec = self.ec_df_mgr.get_diskfile(
'sda', '0', 'a', 'c_ec', 'o', policy=POLICIES[2], frag_index=1)
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def tearDown(self):
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rmtree(os.path.dirname(self.testdir), ignore_errors=1)
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Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
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@patch_policies(_mocked_policies)
class TestAuditor(TestAuditorBase):
def test_worker_conf_parms(self):
def check_common_defaults():
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.max_bytes_per_second, 10000000)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.log_time, 3600)
# test default values
conf = dict(
devices=self.devices,
mount_check='false',
object_size_stats='10,100,1024,10240')
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
check_common_defaults()
for policy in POLICIES:
mgr = auditor_worker.diskfile_router[policy]
self.assertEqual(mgr.disk_chunk_size, 65536)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.max_files_per_second, 20)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.zero_byte_only_at_fps, 0)
# test specified audit value overrides
conf.update({'disk_chunk_size': 4096})
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices,
zero_byte_only_at_fps=50)
check_common_defaults()
for policy in POLICIES:
mgr = auditor_worker.diskfile_router[policy]
self.assertEqual(mgr.disk_chunk_size, 4096)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.max_files_per_second, 50)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.zero_byte_only_at_fps, 50)
def test_object_audit_extra_data(self):
def run_tests(disk_file):
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
data = b'0' * 1024
if disk_file.policy.policy_type == EC_POLICY:
data = disk_file.policy.pyeclib_driver.encode(data)[0]
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
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etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
with disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
etag.update(data)
etag = etag.hexdigest()
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
metadata = {
'ETag': etag,
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
}
if disk_file.policy.policy_type == EC_POLICY:
metadata.update({
'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Frag-Index': '1',
'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Etag': 'fake-etag',
})
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
pre_quarantines = auditor_worker.quarantines
2010-12-16 16:20:57 -08:00
auditor_worker.object_audit(
AuditLocation(disk_file._datadir, 'sda', '0',
policy=disk_file.policy))
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines, pre_quarantines)
2010-12-16 16:20:57 -08:00
os.write(writer._fd, b'extra_data')
auditor_worker.object_audit(
AuditLocation(disk_file._datadir, 'sda', '0',
policy=disk_file.policy))
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines,
pre_quarantines + 1)
run_tests(self.disk_file)
run_tests(self.disk_file_p1)
run_tests(self.disk_file_ec)
2010-12-16 16:20:57 -08:00
def test_object_audit_adds_metadata_checksums(self):
disk_file = self.df_mgr.get_diskfile('sda', '0', 'a', 'c', 'o-md',
policy=POLICIES.legacy)
# simulate a PUT
now = time.time()
data = b'boots and cats and ' * 1024
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
hasher = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
with disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
hasher.update(data)
etag = hasher.hexdigest()
metadata = {
'ETag': etag,
'X-Timestamp': str(normalize_timestamp(now)),
'Content-Length': len(data),
'Content-Type': 'the old type',
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(now))
# simulate a subsequent POST
post_metadata = metadata.copy()
post_metadata['Content-Type'] = 'the new type'
post_metadata['X-Object-Meta-Biff'] = 'buff'
post_metadata['X-Timestamp'] = str(normalize_timestamp(now + 1))
disk_file.write_metadata(post_metadata)
file_paths = [os.path.join(disk_file._datadir, fname)
for fname in os.listdir(disk_file._datadir)
if fname not in ('.', '..')]
file_paths.sort()
# sanity check: make sure we have a .data and a .meta file
self.assertEqual(len(file_paths), 2)
self.assertTrue(file_paths[0].endswith(".data"))
self.assertTrue(file_paths[1].endswith(".meta"))
# Go remove the xattr "user.swift.metadata_checksum" as if this
# object were written before Swift supported metadata checksums.
for file_path in file_paths:
xattr.removexattr(file_path, "user.swift.metadata_checksum")
# Run the auditor...
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
auditor_worker.object_audit(
AuditLocation(disk_file._datadir, 'sda', '0',
policy=disk_file.policy))
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines, 0) # sanity
# ...and the checksums are back
for file_path in file_paths:
metadata = xattr.getxattr(file_path, "user.swift.metadata")
i = 1
while True:
try:
metadata += xattr.getxattr(
file_path, "user.swift.metadata%d" % i)
i += 1
except (IOError, OSError):
break
checksum = xattr.getxattr(
file_path, "user.swift.metadata_checksum")
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
self.assertEqual(
checksum,
(md5(metadata, usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
.encode('ascii')))
def test_object_audit_diff_data(self):
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
data = b'0' * 1024
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
etag.update(data)
etag = etag.hexdigest()
metadata = {
'ETag': etag,
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
pre_quarantines = auditor_worker.quarantines
# remake so it will have metadata
self.disk_file = self.df_mgr.get_diskfile('sda', '0', 'a', 'c', 'o',
policy=POLICIES.legacy)
2010-12-16 16:20:57 -08:00
auditor_worker.object_audit(
AuditLocation(self.disk_file._datadir, 'sda', '0',
policy=POLICIES.legacy))
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines, pre_quarantines)
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(b'1' + b'0' * 1023, usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
metadata['ETag'] = etag
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
auditor_worker.object_audit(
AuditLocation(self.disk_file._datadir, 'sda', '0',
policy=POLICIES.legacy))
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines, pre_quarantines + 1)
2010-07-12 17:03:45 -05:00
def test_object_audit_checks_EC_fragments(self):
disk_file = self.disk_file_ec
def do_test(data):
# create diskfile and set ETag and content-length to match the data
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(data, usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
with disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
metadata = {
'ETag': etag,
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
'Content-Length': len(data),
'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Frag-Index': '1',
'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Etag': 'fake-etag',
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
self.logger.clear()
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
self.assertEqual(0, auditor_worker.quarantines) # sanity check
auditor_worker.object_audit(
AuditLocation(disk_file._datadir, 'sda', '0',
policy=disk_file.policy))
return auditor_worker
# two good frags in an EC archive
frag_0 = disk_file.policy.pyeclib_driver.encode(
b'x' * disk_file.policy.ec_segment_size)[0]
frag_1 = disk_file.policy.pyeclib_driver.encode(
b'y' * disk_file.policy.ec_segment_size)[0]
data = frag_0 + frag_1
auditor_worker = do_test(data)
self.assertEqual(0, auditor_worker.quarantines)
self.assertFalse(auditor_worker.logger.get_lines_for_level('error'))
# corrupt second frag headers
corrupt_frag_1 = b'blah' * 16 + frag_1[64:]
data = frag_0 + corrupt_frag_1
auditor_worker = do_test(data)
self.assertEqual(1, auditor_worker.quarantines)
log_lines = auditor_worker.logger.get_lines_for_level('error')
self.assertIn('failed audit and was quarantined: '
'Invalid EC metadata at offset 0x%x' %
len(frag_0),
log_lines[0])
# dangling extra corrupt frag data
data = frag_0 + frag_1 + b'wtf' * 100
auditor_worker = do_test(data)
self.assertEqual(1, auditor_worker.quarantines)
log_lines = auditor_worker.logger.get_lines_for_level('error')
self.assertIn('failed audit and was quarantined: '
'Invalid EC metadata at offset 0x%x' %
len(frag_0 + frag_1),
log_lines[0])
# simulate bug https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1631144 by writing start
# of an ssync subrequest into the diskfile
data = (
b'PUT /a/c/o\r\n' +
b'Content-Length: 999\r\n' +
b'Content-Type: image/jpeg\r\n' +
b'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Content-Length: 1024\r\n' +
b'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Etag: 1234bff7eb767cc6d19627c6b6f9edef\r\n' +
b'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Frag-Index: 1\r\n' +
b'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Scheme: ' +
DEFAULT_TEST_EC_TYPE.encode('ascii') + b'\r\n' +
b'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Segment-Size: 1048576\r\n' +
b'X-Timestamp: 1471512345.17333\r\n\r\n'
)
data += frag_0[:disk_file.policy.fragment_size - len(data)]
auditor_worker = do_test(data)
self.assertEqual(1, auditor_worker.quarantines)
log_lines = auditor_worker.logger.get_lines_for_level('error')
self.assertIn('failed audit and was quarantined: '
'Invalid EC metadata at offset 0x0',
log_lines[0])
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
def test_object_audit_no_meta(self):
2011-01-24 17:12:38 -08:00
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
path = os.path.join(self.disk_file._datadir, timestamp + '.data')
mkdirs(self.disk_file._datadir)
fp = open(path, 'wb')
fp.write(b'0' * 1024)
2011-01-24 17:12:38 -08:00
fp.close()
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
invalidate_hash(os.path.dirname(self.disk_file._datadir))
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
pre_quarantines = auditor_worker.quarantines
auditor_worker.object_audit(
AuditLocation(self.disk_file._datadir, 'sda', '0',
policy=POLICIES.legacy))
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines, pre_quarantines + 1)
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
def test_object_audit_will_not_swallow_errors_in_tests(self):
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
path = os.path.join(self.disk_file._datadir, timestamp + '.data')
mkdirs(self.disk_file._datadir)
with open(path, 'w') as f:
write_metadata(f, {'name': '/a/c/o'})
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
def blowup(*args):
raise NameError('tpyo')
Alternate DiskFile constructor for efficient auditing. Before, to audit an object, the auditor: - calls listdir(object-hash-dir) - picks out the .data file from the listing - pulls out all N of its user.swift.metadata* xattrs - unpickles them - pulls out the value for 'name' - splits the name into a/c/o - then instantiates and opens a DiskFile(a, c, o), which does the following - joins a/c/o back into a name - hashes the name - calls listdir(object-hash-dir) (AGAIN) - picks out the .data file (and maybe .meta) from the listing (AGAIN) - pulls out all N of its user.swift.metadata* xattrs (AGAIN) - unpickles them (AGAIN) - starts reading object's contents off disk Now, the auditor simply locates the hash dir on the filesystem (saving one listdir) and then hands it off to DiskFileManager.get_diskfile_from_audit_location, which then instantiates a DiskFile in a way that lazy-loads the name later (saving one xattr reading). As part of this, DiskFile.open() will now quarantine a hash "directory" that's actually a file. Before, the audit location generator would skip those, but now they make it clear into DiskFile(). It's better to quarantine them anyway, as they're not doing any good the way they are. Also, removed the was_quarantined attribute on DiskFileReader. Now you can pass in a quarantine_hook callable to DiskFile.reader() that gets called if the file was quarantined. Default is to log quarantines, but otherwise do nothing. Change-Id: I04fc14569982a17fcc89e00832725ae71009335a
2013-10-28 14:57:18 -07:00
with mock.patch.object(DiskFileManager,
'get_diskfile_from_audit_location', blowup):
self.assertRaises(NameError, auditor_worker.object_audit,
AuditLocation(os.path.dirname(path), 'sda', '0',
policy=POLICIES.legacy))
def test_failsafe_object_audit_will_swallow_errors_in_tests(self):
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
path = os.path.join(self.disk_file._datadir, timestamp + '.data')
mkdirs(self.disk_file._datadir)
with open(path, 'w') as f:
write_metadata(f, {'name': '/a/c/o'})
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
def blowup(*args):
raise NameError('tpyo')
with mock.patch('swift.obj.diskfile.DiskFileManager.diskfile_cls',
blowup):
Alternate DiskFile constructor for efficient auditing. Before, to audit an object, the auditor: - calls listdir(object-hash-dir) - picks out the .data file from the listing - pulls out all N of its user.swift.metadata* xattrs - unpickles them - pulls out the value for 'name' - splits the name into a/c/o - then instantiates and opens a DiskFile(a, c, o), which does the following - joins a/c/o back into a name - hashes the name - calls listdir(object-hash-dir) (AGAIN) - picks out the .data file (and maybe .meta) from the listing (AGAIN) - pulls out all N of its user.swift.metadata* xattrs (AGAIN) - unpickles them (AGAIN) - starts reading object's contents off disk Now, the auditor simply locates the hash dir on the filesystem (saving one listdir) and then hands it off to DiskFileManager.get_diskfile_from_audit_location, which then instantiates a DiskFile in a way that lazy-loads the name later (saving one xattr reading). As part of this, DiskFile.open() will now quarantine a hash "directory" that's actually a file. Before, the audit location generator would skip those, but now they make it clear into DiskFile(). It's better to quarantine them anyway, as they're not doing any good the way they are. Also, removed the was_quarantined attribute on DiskFileReader. Now you can pass in a quarantine_hook callable to DiskFile.reader() that gets called if the file was quarantined. Default is to log quarantines, but otherwise do nothing. Change-Id: I04fc14569982a17fcc89e00832725ae71009335a
2013-10-28 14:57:18 -07:00
auditor_worker.failsafe_object_audit(
AuditLocation(os.path.dirname(path), 'sda', '0',
policy=POLICIES.legacy))
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.errors, 1)
def test_audit_location_gets_quarantined(self):
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
location = AuditLocation(self.disk_file._datadir, 'sda', '0',
policy=self.disk_file.policy)
# instead of a datadir, we'll make a file!
mkdirs(os.path.dirname(self.disk_file._datadir))
open(self.disk_file._datadir, 'w')
# after we turn the crank ...
auditor_worker.object_audit(location)
# ... it should get quarantined
self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(self.disk_file._datadir))
self.assertEqual(1, auditor_worker.quarantines)
def test_rsync_tempfile_timeout_auto_option(self):
# if we don't have access to the replicator config section we'll use
# our default
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.rsync_tempfile_timeout, 86400)
# if the rsync_tempfile_timeout option is set explicitly we use that
self.conf['rsync_tempfile_timeout'] = '1800'
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.rsync_tempfile_timeout, 1800)
# if we have a real config we can be a little smarter
config_path = os.path.join(self.testdir, 'objserver.conf')
stub_config = """
[object-auditor]
rsync_tempfile_timeout = auto
"""
with open(config_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(textwrap.dedent(stub_config))
# the Daemon loader will hand the object-auditor config to the
# auditor who will build the workers from it
conf = readconf(config_path, 'object-auditor')
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
# if there is no object-replicator section we still have to fall back
# to default because we can't parse the config for that section!
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.rsync_tempfile_timeout, 86400)
stub_config = """
[object-replicator]
[object-auditor]
rsync_tempfile_timeout = auto
"""
with open(config_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(textwrap.dedent(stub_config))
conf = readconf(config_path, 'object-auditor')
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
# if the object-replicator section will parse but does not override
# the default rsync_timeout we assume the default rsync_timeout value
# and add 15mins
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.rsync_tempfile_timeout,
replicator.DEFAULT_RSYNC_TIMEOUT + 900)
stub_config = """
[DEFAULT]
reclaim_age = 1209600
[object-replicator]
rsync_timeout = 3600
[object-auditor]
rsync_tempfile_timeout = auto
"""
with open(config_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(textwrap.dedent(stub_config))
conf = readconf(config_path, 'object-auditor')
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
# if there is an object-replicator section with a rsync_timeout
# configured we'll use that value (3600) + 900
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.rsync_tempfile_timeout, 3600 + 900)
def test_inprogress_rsync_tempfiles_get_cleaned_up(self):
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
location = AuditLocation(self.disk_file._datadir, 'sda', '0',
policy=self.disk_file.policy)
data = b'VERIFY'
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
etag.update(data)
metadata = {
'ETag': etag.hexdigest(),
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
datafilename = None
datadir_files = os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir)
for filename in datadir_files:
if filename.endswith('.data'):
datafilename = filename
break
else:
self.fail('Did not find .data file in %r: %r' %
(self.disk_file._datadir, datadir_files))
rsynctempfile_path = os.path.join(self.disk_file._datadir,
'.%s.9ILVBL' % datafilename)
open(rsynctempfile_path, 'w')
# sanity check we have an extra file
rsync_files = os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir)
self.assertEqual(len(datadir_files) + 1, len(rsync_files))
# and after we turn the crank ...
auditor_worker.object_audit(location)
# ... we've still got the rsync file
self.assertEqual(rsync_files, os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir))
# and we'll keep it - depending on the rsync_tempfile_timeout
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.rsync_tempfile_timeout, 86400)
self.conf['rsync_tempfile_timeout'] = '3600'
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.rsync_tempfile_timeout, 3600)
now = time.time() + 1900
with mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.time.time',
return_value=now):
auditor_worker.object_audit(location)
self.assertEqual(rsync_files, os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir))
# but *tomorrow* when we run
tomorrow = time.time() + 86400
with mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.time.time',
return_value=tomorrow):
auditor_worker.object_audit(location)
# ... we'll totally clean that stuff up!
self.assertEqual(datadir_files, os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir))
# but if we have some random crazy file in there
random_crazy_file_path = os.path.join(self.disk_file._datadir,
'.random.crazy.file')
open(random_crazy_file_path, 'w')
tomorrow = time.time() + 86400
with mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.time.time',
return_value=tomorrow):
auditor_worker.object_audit(location)
# that's someone elses problem
self.assertIn(os.path.basename(random_crazy_file_path),
os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir))
def test_generic_exception_handling(self):
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
# pretend that we logged (and reset counters) just now
auditor_worker.last_logged = time.time()
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
pre_errors = auditor_worker.errors
data = b'0' * 1024
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
etag.update(data)
etag = etag.hexdigest()
metadata = {
'ETag': etag,
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
with mock.patch('swift.obj.diskfile.DiskFileManager.diskfile_cls',
lambda *_: 1 / 0):
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects()
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.errors, pre_errors + 1)
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
def test_object_run_once_pass(self):
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
auditor_worker.log_time = 0
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
pre_quarantines = auditor_worker.quarantines
data = b'0' * 1024
def write_file(df):
with df.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
metadata = {
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
'ETag': md5(data, usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest(),
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
# policy 0
write_file(self.disk_file)
# policy 1
write_file(self.disk_file_p1)
# policy 2
write_file(self.disk_file_ec)
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects()
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines, pre_quarantines)
# 1 object per policy falls into 1024 bucket
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.stats_buckets[1024], 3)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.stats_buckets[10240], 0)
# pick up some additional code coverage, large file
data = b'0' * 1024 * 1024
for df in (self.disk_file, self.disk_file_ec):
with df.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
metadata = {
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
'ETag': md5(data, usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest(),
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects(device_dirs=['sda', 'sdb'])
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines, pre_quarantines)
# still have the 1024 byte object left in policy-1 (plus the
# stats from the original 3)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.stats_buckets[1024], 4)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.stats_buckets[10240], 0)
# and then policy-0 disk_file was re-written as a larger object
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.stats_buckets['OVER'], 2)
# pick up even more additional code coverage, misc paths
auditor_worker.log_time = -1
auditor_worker.stats_sizes = []
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects(device_dirs=['sda', 'sdb'])
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines, pre_quarantines)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.stats_buckets[1024], 4)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.stats_buckets[10240], 0)
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.stats_buckets['OVER'], 2)
def test_object_run_logging(self):
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects(device_dirs=['sda'])
log_lines = self.logger.get_lines_for_level('info')
self.assertGreater(len(log_lines), 0)
self.assertIn('ALL - parallel, sda', log_lines[0])
self.logger.clear()
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices,
zero_byte_only_at_fps=50)
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects(device_dirs=['sda'])
log_lines = self.logger.get_lines_for_level('info')
self.assertGreater(len(log_lines), 0)
self.assertIn('ZBF - sda', log_lines[0])
def test_object_run_recon_cache(self):
ts = Timestamp(time.time())
data = b'test_data'
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
metadata = {
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
'ETag': md5(data, usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest(),
'X-Timestamp': ts.normal,
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(ts)
# all devices
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects()
with open(self.rcache) as fd:
actual_rcache = json.load(fd)
expected = {'object_auditor_stats_ALL':
{'passes': 1, 'errors': 0, 'audit_time': mock.ANY,
'start_time': mock.ANY, 'quarantined': 0,
'bytes_processed': 9}}
with open(self.rcache) as fd:
actual_rcache = json.load(fd)
self.assertEqual(expected, actual_rcache)
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices,
zero_byte_only_at_fps=50)
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects()
self.assertEqual(expected, actual_rcache)
with open(self.rcache) as fd:
actual_rcache = json.load(fd)
expected.update({
'object_auditor_stats_ZBF':
{'passes': 1, 'errors': 0, 'audit_time': mock.ANY,
'start_time': mock.ANY, 'quarantined': 0,
'bytes_processed': 0}})
self.assertEqual(expected, actual_rcache)
# specific devices
os.unlink(self.rcache)
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects(device_dirs=['sda'])
with open(self.rcache) as fd:
actual_rcache = json.load(fd)
expected = {'object_auditor_stats_ALL':
{'sda': {'passes': 1, 'errors': 0, 'audit_time': mock.ANY,
'start_time': mock.ANY, 'quarantined': 0,
'bytes_processed': 9}}}
with open(self.rcache) as fd:
actual_rcache = json.load(fd)
self.assertEqual(expected, actual_rcache)
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices,
zero_byte_only_at_fps=50)
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects(device_dirs=['sda'])
self.assertEqual(expected, actual_rcache)
with open(self.rcache) as fd:
actual_rcache = json.load(fd)
expected.update({
'object_auditor_stats_ZBF':
{'sda': {'passes': 1, 'errors': 0, 'audit_time': mock.ANY,
'start_time': mock.ANY, 'quarantined': 0,
'bytes_processed': 0}}})
self.assertEqual(expected, actual_rcache)
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
def test_object_run_once_no_sda(self):
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
pre_quarantines = auditor_worker.quarantines
# pretend that we logged (and reset counters) just now
auditor_worker.last_logged = time.time()
data = b'0' * 1024
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
etag.update(data)
etag = etag.hexdigest()
metadata = {
'ETag': etag,
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
}
writer.put(metadata)
os.write(writer._fd, b'extra_data')
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects()
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines, pre_quarantines + 1)
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
def test_object_run_once_multi_devices(self):
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
# pretend that we logged (and reset counters) just now
auditor_worker.last_logged = time.time()
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
pre_quarantines = auditor_worker.quarantines
data = b'0' * 10
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
etag.update(data)
etag = etag.hexdigest()
metadata = {
'ETag': etag,
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects()
self.disk_file = self.df_mgr.get_diskfile('sda', '0', 'a', 'c', 'ob',
policy=POLICIES.legacy)
data = b'1' * 10
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
etag.update(data)
etag = etag.hexdigest()
metadata = {
'ETag': etag,
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
os.write(writer._fd, b'extra_data')
auditor_worker.audit_all_objects()
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.quarantines, pre_quarantines + 1)
2010-12-28 14:54:00 -08:00
def test_object_run_fast_track_non_zero(self):
self.auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(self.conf)
self.auditor.log_time = 0
data = b'0' * 1024
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
etag.update(data)
etag = etag.hexdigest()
timestamp = str(normalize_timestamp(time.time()))
metadata = {
'ETag': etag,
'X-Timestamp': timestamp,
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
etag.update(b'1' + b'0' * 1023)
etag = etag.hexdigest()
metadata['ETag'] = etag
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
write_metadata(writer._fd, metadata)
quarantine_path = os.path.join(self.devices,
'sda', 'quarantined', 'objects')
kwargs = {'mode': 'once'}
kwargs['zero_byte_fps'] = 50
self.auditor.run_audit(**kwargs)
self.assertFalse(os.path.isdir(quarantine_path))
del(kwargs['zero_byte_fps'])
clear_auditor_status(self.devices, 'objects')
self.auditor.run_audit(**kwargs)
self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(quarantine_path))
def setup_bad_zero_byte(self, timestamp=None):
if timestamp is None:
timestamp = Timestamp.now()
self.auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(self.conf)
self.auditor.log_time = 0
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
etag = etag.hexdigest()
metadata = {
'ETag': etag,
'X-Timestamp': timestamp.internal,
'Content-Length': 10,
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(Timestamp(timestamp))
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
etag = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
etag = etag.hexdigest()
metadata['ETag'] = etag
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
write_metadata(writer._fd, metadata)
2011-02-21 16:37:12 -08:00
def test_object_run_fast_track_all(self):
self.setup_bad_zero_byte()
kwargs = {'mode': 'once'}
self.auditor.run_audit(**kwargs)
quarantine_path = os.path.join(self.devices,
'sda', 'quarantined', 'objects')
self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(quarantine_path))
2011-02-21 16:37:12 -08:00
def test_object_run_fast_track_zero(self):
self.setup_bad_zero_byte()
kwargs = {'mode': 'once'}
kwargs['zero_byte_fps'] = 50
called_args = [0]
def mock_get_auditor_status(path, logger, audit_type):
called_args[0] = audit_type
return get_auditor_status(path, logger, audit_type)
with mock.patch('swift.obj.diskfile.get_auditor_status',
mock_get_auditor_status):
self.auditor.run_audit(**kwargs)
2011-02-21 16:37:12 -08:00
quarantine_path = os.path.join(self.devices,
'sda', 'quarantined', 'objects')
self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(quarantine_path))
self.assertEqual('ZBF', called_args[0])
2010-07-12 17:03:45 -05:00
2011-08-30 14:29:19 -07:00
def test_object_run_fast_track_zero_check_closed(self):
rat = [False]
class FakeFile(DiskFile):
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
def _quarantine(self, data_file, msg):
2011-08-30 14:29:19 -07:00
rat[0] = True
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
DiskFile._quarantine(self, data_file, msg)
2011-08-30 14:29:19 -07:00
self.setup_bad_zero_byte()
with mock.patch('swift.obj.diskfile.DiskFileManager.diskfile_cls',
FakeFile):
kwargs = {'mode': 'once'}
kwargs['zero_byte_fps'] = 50
self.auditor.run_audit(**kwargs)
2011-08-31 07:28:36 -07:00
quarantine_path = os.path.join(self.devices,
'sda', 'quarantined', 'objects')
self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(quarantine_path))
self.assertTrue(rat[0])
2011-08-30 14:29:19 -07:00
@mock.patch.object(auditor.ObjectAuditor, 'run_audit')
@mock.patch('os.fork', return_value=0)
def test_with_inaccessible_object_location(self, mock_os_fork,
mock_run_audit):
# Need to ensure that any failures in run_audit do
# not prevent sys.exit() from running. Otherwise we get
# zombie processes.
e = OSError('permission denied')
mock_run_audit.side_effect = e
self.auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(self.conf)
self.assertRaises(SystemExit, self.auditor.fork_child, self)
def test_with_only_tombstone(self):
# sanity check that auditor doesn't touch solitary tombstones
ts_iter = make_timestamp_iter()
self.setup_bad_zero_byte(timestamp=next(ts_iter))
self.disk_file.delete(next(ts_iter))
files = os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir)
self.assertEqual(1, len(files))
self.assertTrue(files[0].endswith('ts'))
kwargs = {'mode': 'once'}
self.auditor.run_audit(**kwargs)
files_after = os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir)
self.assertEqual(files, files_after)
def test_with_tombstone_and_data(self):
# rsync replication could leave a tombstone and data file in object
# dir - verify they are both removed during audit
ts_iter = make_timestamp_iter()
ts_tomb = next(ts_iter)
ts_data = next(ts_iter)
self.setup_bad_zero_byte(timestamp=ts_data)
tomb_file_path = os.path.join(self.disk_file._datadir,
'%s.ts' % ts_tomb.internal)
with open(tomb_file_path, 'wb') as fd:
write_metadata(fd, {'X-Timestamp': ts_tomb.internal})
files = os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir)
self.assertEqual(2, len(files))
self.assertTrue(os.path.basename(tomb_file_path) in files, files)
kwargs = {'mode': 'once'}
self.auditor.run_audit(**kwargs)
self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(self.disk_file._datadir))
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
def _audit_tombstone(self, conf, ts_tomb, zero_byte_fps=0):
self.auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(conf)
self.auditor.log_time = 0
# create tombstone and hashes.pkl file, ensuring the tombstone is not
# reclaimed by mocking time to be the tombstone time
with mock.patch('time.time', return_value=float(ts_tomb)):
# this delete will create an invalid hashes entry
self.disk_file.delete(ts_tomb)
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
# this get_hashes call will truncate the invalid hashes entry
self.disk_file.manager.get_hashes(
'sda', '0', [], self.disk_file.policy)
suffix = basename(dirname(self.disk_file._datadir))
part_dir = dirname(dirname(self.disk_file._datadir))
# sanity checks...
self.assertEqual(['%s.ts' % ts_tomb.internal],
os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir))
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_FILE)))
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
hash_invalid = os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_INVALIDATIONS_FILE)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(hash_invalid))
with open(hash_invalid, 'rb') as fp:
self.assertEqual(b'', fp.read().strip(b'\n'))
# Run auditor
self.auditor.run_audit(mode='once', zero_byte_fps=zero_byte_fps)
# sanity check - auditor should not remove tombstone file
self.assertEqual(['%s.ts' % ts_tomb.internal],
os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir))
return part_dir, suffix
def test_non_reclaimable_tombstone(self):
# audit with a recent tombstone
ts_tomb = Timestamp(time.time() - 55)
part_dir, suffix = self._audit_tombstone(self.conf, ts_tomb)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_FILE)))
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
hash_invalid = os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_INVALIDATIONS_FILE)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(hash_invalid))
with open(hash_invalid, 'rb') as fp:
self.assertEqual(b'', fp.read().strip(b'\n'))
def test_reclaimable_tombstone(self):
# audit with a reclaimable tombstone
ts_tomb = Timestamp(time.time() - 604800)
part_dir, suffix = self._audit_tombstone(self.conf, ts_tomb)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_FILE)))
hash_invalid = os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_INVALIDATIONS_FILE)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(hash_invalid))
with open(hash_invalid, 'rb') as fp:
hash_val = fp.read()
self.assertEqual(suffix.encode('ascii'), hash_val.strip(b'\n'))
def test_non_reclaimable_tombstone_with_custom_reclaim_age(self):
# audit with a tombstone newer than custom reclaim age
ts_tomb = Timestamp(time.time() - 604800)
conf = dict(self.conf)
conf['reclaim_age'] = 2 * 604800
part_dir, suffix = self._audit_tombstone(conf, ts_tomb)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_FILE)))
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
hash_invalid = os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_INVALIDATIONS_FILE)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(hash_invalid))
with open(hash_invalid, 'rb') as fp:
self.assertEqual(b'', fp.read().strip(b'\n'))
def test_reclaimable_tombstone_with_custom_reclaim_age(self):
# audit with a tombstone older than custom reclaim age
ts_tomb = Timestamp(time.time() - 55)
conf = dict(self.conf)
conf['reclaim_age'] = 10
part_dir, suffix = self._audit_tombstone(conf, ts_tomb)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_FILE)))
hash_invalid = os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_INVALIDATIONS_FILE)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(hash_invalid))
with open(hash_invalid, 'rb') as fp:
hash_val = fp.read()
self.assertEqual(suffix.encode('ascii'), hash_val.strip(b'\n'))
def test_reclaimable_tombstone_with_zero_byte_fps(self):
# audit with a tombstone older than reclaim age by a zero_byte_fps
# worker does not invalidate the hash
ts_tomb = Timestamp(time.time() - 604800)
part_dir, suffix = self._audit_tombstone(
self.conf, ts_tomb, zero_byte_fps=50)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_FILE)))
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
hash_invalid = os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_INVALIDATIONS_FILE)
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(hash_invalid))
with open(hash_invalid, 'rb') as fp:
self.assertEqual(b'', fp.read().strip(b'\n'))
def _test_expired_object_is_ignored(self, zero_byte_fps):
# verify that an expired object does not get mistaken for a tombstone
audit = auditor.ObjectAuditor(self.conf, logger=self.logger)
audit.log_time = 0
now = time.time()
write_diskfile(self.disk_file, Timestamp(now - 20),
extra_metadata={'X-Delete-At': now - 10})
files = os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir)
self.assertTrue([f for f in files if f.endswith('.data')]) # sanity
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
# diskfile write appends to invalid hashes file
part_dir = dirname(dirname(self.disk_file._datadir))
hash_invalid = os.path.join(part_dir, HASH_INVALIDATIONS_FILE)
with open(hash_invalid, 'rb') as fp:
self.assertEqual(
basename(dirname(self.disk_file._datadir)).encode('ascii'),
fp.read().strip(b'\n')) # sanity check
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
# run the auditor...
with mock.patch.object(auditor, 'dump_recon_cache'):
audit.run_audit(mode='once', zero_byte_fps=zero_byte_fps)
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
# the auditor doesn't touch anything on the invalidation file
# (i.e. not truncate and add no entry)
with open(hash_invalid, 'rb') as fp:
self.assertEqual(
basename(dirname(self.disk_file._datadir)).encode('ascii'),
fp.read().strip(b'\n')) # sanity check
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
# this get_hashes call will truncate the invalid hashes entry
self.disk_file.manager.get_hashes(
'sda', '0', [], self.disk_file.policy)
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
with open(hash_invalid, 'rb') as fp:
self.assertEqual(b'', fp.read().strip(b'\n')) # sanity check
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
# run the auditor, again...
with mock.patch.object(auditor, 'dump_recon_cache'):
audit.run_audit(mode='once', zero_byte_fps=zero_byte_fps)
# verify nothing changed
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(self.disk_file._datadir))
self.assertEqual(files, os.listdir(self.disk_file._datadir))
self.assertFalse(audit.logger.get_lines_for_level('error'))
self.assertFalse(audit.logger.get_lines_for_level('warning'))
Fix race in new partitions detecting new/invalid suffixes. The assumption that we don't need to write an entry in the invalidations file when the hashes.pkl does not exist turned out to be a premature optimization and also wrong. Primarily we should recognize the creation of hashes.pkl is the first thing that happens in a part when it lands on a new primary. The code should be optimized toward the assumption of the most common disk state. Also, in this case the extra stat calls to check if the hashes.pkl exists were not only un-optimized - but introducing a race. Consider the common case: proc 1 | proc 2 -------------------------------|--------------------------- a) read then truncate journal | b) do work | c) append to journal d) apply "a" to index | The index written at "d" may not (yet) reflect the entry writen by proc 2 at "c"; however, it's clearly in the journal so it's easy to see we're safe. Adding in the extra stat call for the index existence check increases the state which can effect correctness. proc 1 | proc 2 ------------------------------|--------------------------- a) no index, truncate journal | b) do work | b) iff index exists | c) append to journal d) apply (or create) index | If step "c" doesn't happen because the index does not yet exist - the update is clearly lost. In our case we'd skip marking a suffix as invalid when the hashes.pkl does not exist because we know "the next time we rehash" we'll have to os.listdir suffixes anyway. But if another process is *currently* rehashing (and has already done it's os.listdir) instead we've just dropped an invalidation on the floor. Don't do that. Instead - write down the invalidation. The running rehash is welcome to proceed on outdated information - as long as the next pass will grab and hash the new suffix. Known-Issue(s): If the suffix already exists there's an even chance the running rehash will hash in the very update for which we want to invalidate the suffix, but that's ok it's idempotent. Co-Author: Pavel Kvasnička <pavel.kvasnicka@firma.seznam.cz> Co-Author: Alistair Coles <alistair.coles@hpe.com> Co-Author: Kota Tsuyuzaki <tsuyuzaki.kota@lab.ntt.co.jp> Related-Change-Id: I64cadb1a3feb4d819d545137eecfc295389794f0 Change-Id: I2b48238d9d684e831d9777a7b18f91a3cef57cd1 Closes-Bug: #1651530
2017-01-10 18:53:08 -08:00
# and there was no hash invalidation
with open(hash_invalid, 'rb') as fp:
self.assertEqual(b'', fp.read().strip(b'\n'))
def test_expired_object_is_ignored(self):
self._test_expired_object_is_ignored(0)
def test_expired_object_is_ignored_with_zero_byte_fps(self):
self._test_expired_object_is_ignored(50)
def test_auditor_reclaim_age(self):
# if we don't have access to the replicator config section we'll use
# diskfile's default
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
router = auditor_worker.diskfile_router
for policy in POLICIES:
self.assertEqual(router[policy].reclaim_age, 86400 * 7)
# if the reclaim_age option is set explicitly we use that
self.conf['reclaim_age'] = '1800'
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(self.conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
router = auditor_worker.diskfile_router
for policy in POLICIES:
self.assertEqual(router[policy].reclaim_age, 1800)
# if we have a real config we can be a little smarter
config_path = os.path.join(self.testdir, 'objserver.conf')
# if there is no object-replicator section we still have to fall back
# to default because we can't parse the config for that section!
stub_config = """
[object-auditor]
"""
with open(config_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(textwrap.dedent(stub_config))
conf = readconf(config_path, 'object-auditor')
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
router = auditor_worker.diskfile_router
for policy in POLICIES:
self.assertEqual(router[policy].reclaim_age, 86400 * 7)
# verify reclaim_age is of auditor config value
stub_config = """
[object-replicator]
[object-auditor]
reclaim_age = 60
"""
with open(config_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(textwrap.dedent(stub_config))
conf = readconf(config_path, 'object-auditor')
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
router = auditor_worker.diskfile_router
for policy in POLICIES:
self.assertEqual(router[policy].reclaim_age, 60)
# verify reclaim_age falls back to replicator config value
# if there is no auditor config value
config_path = os.path.join(self.testdir, 'objserver.conf')
stub_config = """
[object-replicator]
reclaim_age = 60
[object-auditor]
"""
with open(config_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(textwrap.dedent(stub_config))
conf = readconf(config_path, 'object-auditor')
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
router = auditor_worker.diskfile_router
for policy in POLICIES:
self.assertEqual(router[policy].reclaim_age, 60)
# we'll prefer our own DEFAULT section to the replicator though
self.assertEqual(auditor_worker.rsync_tempfile_timeout,
replicator.DEFAULT_RSYNC_TIMEOUT + 900)
stub_config = """
[DEFAULT]
reclaim_age = 1209600
[object-replicator]
reclaim_age = 1800
[object-auditor]
"""
with open(config_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(textwrap.dedent(stub_config))
conf = readconf(config_path, 'object-auditor')
auditor_worker = auditor.AuditorWorker(conf, self.logger,
self.rcache, self.devices)
router = auditor_worker.diskfile_router
for policy in POLICIES:
self.assertEqual(router[policy].reclaim_age, 1209600)
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
def test_sleeper(self):
with mock.patch(
'time.sleep', mock.MagicMock()) as mock_sleep:
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(self.conf)
my_auditor._sleep()
mock_sleep.assert_called_with(30)
my_conf = dict(interval=2)
my_conf.update(self.conf)
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(my_conf)
my_auditor._sleep()
mock_sleep.assert_called_with(2)
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(self.conf)
my_auditor.interval = 2
my_auditor._sleep()
mock_sleep.assert_called_with(2)
DiskFile API, with reference implementation Refactor on-disk knowledge out of the object server by pushing the async update pickle creation to the new DiskFileManager class (name is not the best, so suggestions welcome), along with the REPLICATOR method logic. We also move the mount checking and thread pool storage to the new ondisk.Devices object, which then also becomes the new home of the audit_location_generator method. For the object server, a new setup() method is now called at the end of the controller's construction, and the _diskfile() method has been renamed to get_diskfile(), to allow implementation specific behavior. We then hide the need for the REST API layer to know how and where quarantining needs to be performed. There are now two places it is checked internally, on open() where we verify the content-length, name, and x-timestamp metadata, and in the reader on close where the etag metadata is checked if the entire file was read. We add a reader class to allow implementations to isolate the WSGI handling code for that specific environment (it is used no-where else in the REST APIs). This simplifies the caller's code to just use a "with" statement once open to avoid multiple points where close needs to be called. For a full historical comparison, including the usage patterns see: https://gist.github.com/portante/5488238 (as of master, 2b639f5, Merge "Fix 500 from account-quota This Commit middleware") --------------------------------+------------------------------------ DiskFileManager(conf) Methods: .pickle_async_update() .get_diskfile() .get_hashes() Attributes: .devices .logger .disk_chunk_size .keep_cache_size .bytes_per_sync DiskFile(a,c,o,keep_data_fp=) DiskFile(a,c,o) Methods: Methods: *.__iter__() .close(verify_file=) .is_deleted() .is_expired() .quarantine() .get_data_file_size() .open() .read_metadata() .create() .create() .write_metadata() .delete() .delete() Attributes: Attributes: .quarantined_dir .keep_cache .metadata *DiskFileReader() Methods: .__iter__() .close() Attributes: +.was_quarantined DiskWriter() DiskFileWriter() Methods: Methods: .write() .write() .put() .put() * Note that the DiskFile class * Note that the DiskReader() object implements all the methods returned by the necessary for a WSGI app DiskFileOpened.reader() method iterator implements all the methods necessary for a WSGI app iterator + Note that if the auditor is refactored to not use the DiskFile class, see https://review.openstack.org/44787 then we don't need the was_quarantined attribute A reference "in-memory" object server implementation of a backend DiskFile class in swift/obj/mem_server.py and swift/obj/mem_diskfile.py. One can also reference https://github.com/portante/gluster-swift/commits/diskfile for the proposed integration with the gluster-swift code based on these changes. Change-Id: I44e153fdb405a5743e9c05349008f94136764916 Signed-off-by: Peter Portante <peter.portante@redhat.com>
2013-09-12 19:51:18 -04:00
def test_run_parallel_audit(self):
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
class StopForever(Exception):
pass
class Bogus(Exception):
pass
loop_error = Bogus('exception')
class LetMeOut(BaseException):
pass
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
class ObjectAuditorMock(object):
check_args = ()
check_kwargs = {}
check_device_dir = None
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
fork_called = 0
master = 0
wait_called = 0
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
def mock_run(self, *args, **kwargs):
self.check_args = args
self.check_kwargs = kwargs
if 'zero_byte_fps' in kwargs:
self.check_device_dir = kwargs.get('device_dirs')
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
def mock_sleep_stop(self):
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raise StopForever('stop')
def mock_sleep_continue(self):
return
def mock_audit_loop_error(self, parent, zbo_fps,
override_devices=None, **kwargs):
raise loop_error
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def mock_fork(self):
self.fork_called += 1
if self.master:
return self.fork_called
else:
return 0
def mock_wait(self):
self.wait_called += 1
return (self.wait_called, 0)
def mock_signal(self, sig, action):
pass
def mock_exit(self):
pass
for i in string.ascii_letters[2:26]:
mkdirs(os.path.join(self.devices, 'sd%s' % i))
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my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(dict(devices=self.devices,
mount_check='false',
zero_byte_files_per_second=89,
concurrency=1))
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mocker = ObjectAuditorMock()
my_auditor.logger.exception = mock.MagicMock()
real_audit_loop = my_auditor.audit_loop
my_auditor.audit_loop = mocker.mock_audit_loop_error
my_auditor.run_audit = mocker.mock_run
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
was_fork = os.fork
was_wait = os.wait
was_signal = signal.signal
was_exit = sys.exit
os.fork = mocker.mock_fork
os.wait = mocker.mock_wait
signal.signal = mocker.mock_signal
sys.exit = mocker.mock_exit
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
try:
my_auditor._sleep = mocker.mock_sleep_stop
my_auditor.run_once(zero_byte_fps=50)
my_auditor.logger.exception.assert_called_once_with(
'ERROR auditing: %s', loop_error)
my_auditor.logger.exception.reset_mock()
self.assertRaises(StopForever, my_auditor.run_forever)
my_auditor.logger.exception.assert_called_once_with(
'ERROR auditing: %s', loop_error)
my_auditor.audit_loop = real_audit_loop
# sleep between ZBF scanner forks
self.assertRaises(StopForever, my_auditor.fork_child, True, True)
mocker.fork_called = 0
signal.signal = was_signal
sys.exit = was_exit
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
self.assertRaises(StopForever,
my_auditor.run_forever, zero_byte_fps=50)
self.assertEqual(mocker.check_kwargs['zero_byte_fps'], 50)
self.assertEqual(mocker.fork_called, 0)
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
self.assertRaises(SystemExit, my_auditor.run_once)
self.assertEqual(mocker.fork_called, 1)
self.assertEqual(mocker.check_kwargs['zero_byte_fps'], 89)
self.assertEqual(mocker.check_device_dir, [])
self.assertEqual(mocker.check_args, ())
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
device_list = ['sd%s' % i for i in string.ascii_letters[2:10]]
device_string = ','.join(device_list)
device_string_bogus = device_string + ',bogus'
mocker.fork_called = 0
self.assertRaises(SystemExit, my_auditor.run_once,
devices=device_string_bogus)
self.assertEqual(mocker.fork_called, 1)
self.assertEqual(mocker.check_kwargs['zero_byte_fps'], 89)
self.assertEqual(sorted(mocker.check_device_dir), device_list)
mocker.master = 1
mocker.fork_called = 0
self.assertRaises(StopForever, my_auditor.run_forever)
# Fork or Wait are called greate than or equal to 2 times in the
# main process. 2 times if zbf run once and 3 times if zbf run
# again
self.assertGreaterEqual(mocker.fork_called, 2)
self.assertGreaterEqual(mocker.wait_called, 2)
my_auditor._sleep = mocker.mock_sleep_continue
my_auditor.audit_loop = works_only_once(my_auditor.audit_loop,
LetMeOut())
my_auditor.concurrency = 2
mocker.fork_called = 0
mocker.wait_called = 0
self.assertRaises(LetMeOut, my_auditor.run_forever)
# Fork or Wait are called greater than or equal to
# no. of devices + (no. of devices)/2 + 1 times in main process
no_devices = len(os.listdir(self.devices))
self.assertGreaterEqual(mocker.fork_called, no_devices +
no_devices / 2 + 1)
self.assertGreaterEqual(mocker.wait_called, no_devices +
no_devices / 2 + 1)
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
finally:
os.fork = was_fork
os.wait = was_wait
2011-02-24 12:27:20 -08:00
def test_run_audit_once(self):
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(dict(devices=self.devices,
mount_check='false',
zero_byte_files_per_second=89,
concurrency=1))
forked_pids = []
next_zbf_pid = [2]
next_normal_pid = [1001]
outstanding_pids = [[]]
def fake_fork_child(**kwargs):
if len(forked_pids) > 10:
# something's gone horribly wrong
raise BaseException("forking too much")
# ZBF pids are all smaller than the normal-audit pids; this way
# we can return them first.
#
# Also, ZBF pids are even and normal-audit pids are odd; this is
# so humans seeing this test fail can better tell what's happening.
if kwargs.get('zero_byte_fps'):
pid = next_zbf_pid[0]
next_zbf_pid[0] += 2
else:
pid = next_normal_pid[0]
next_normal_pid[0] += 2
outstanding_pids[0].append(pid)
forked_pids.append(pid)
return pid
def fake_os_wait():
# Smallest pid first; that's ZBF if we have one, else normal
outstanding_pids[0].sort()
pid = outstanding_pids[0].pop(0)
return (pid, 0) # (pid, status)
with mock.patch("swift.obj.auditor.os.wait", fake_os_wait), \
mock.patch.object(my_auditor, 'fork_child', fake_fork_child), \
mock.patch.object(my_auditor, '_sleep', lambda *a: None):
my_auditor.run_once()
self.assertEqual(sorted(forked_pids), [2, 1001])
def test_run_audit_once_zbfps(self):
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(dict(devices=self.devices,
mount_check='false',
zero_byte_files_per_second=89,
concurrency=1,
recon_cache_path=self.testdir))
with mock.patch.object(my_auditor, '_sleep', lambda *a: None):
my_auditor.run_once(zero_byte_fps=50)
with open(self.rcache) as fd:
# there's no objects to audit so expect no stats; this assertion
# may change if https://bugs.launchpad.net/swift/+bug/1704858 is
# fixed
self.assertEqual({}, json.load(fd))
# check recon cache stays clean after a second run
with mock.patch.object(my_auditor, '_sleep', lambda *a: None):
my_auditor.run_once(zero_byte_fps=50)
with open(self.rcache) as fd:
self.assertEqual({}, json.load(fd))
ts = Timestamp(time.time())
with self.disk_file.create() as writer:
metadata = {
replace md5 with swift utils version md5 is not an approved algorithm in FIPS mode, and trying to instantiate a hashlib.md5() will fail when the system is running in FIPS mode. md5 is allowed when in a non-security context. There is a plan to add a keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) to hashlib.md5() to annotate whether or not the instance is being used in a security context. In the case where it is not, the instantiation of md5 will be allowed. See https://bugs.python.org/issue9216 for more details. Some downstream python versions already support this parameter. To support these versions, a new encapsulation of md5() is added to swift/common/utils.py. This encapsulation is identical to the one being added to oslo.utils, but is recreated here to avoid adding a dependency. This patch is to replace the instances of hashlib.md5() with this new encapsulation, adding an annotation indicating whether the usage is a security context or not. While this patch seems large, it is really just the same change over and again. Reviewers need to pay particular attention as to whether the keyword parameter (usedforsecurity) is set correctly. Right now, all of them appear to be not used in a security context. Now that all the instances have been converted, we can update the bandit run to look for these instances and ensure that new invocations do not creep in. With this latest patch, the functional and unit tests all pass on a FIPS enabled system. Co-Authored-By: Pete Zaitcev Change-Id: Ibb4917da4c083e1e094156d748708b87387f2d87
2020-09-11 16:28:11 -04:00
'ETag': md5(b'', usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest(),
'X-Timestamp': ts.normal,
'Content-Length': str(os.fstat(writer._fd).st_size),
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(ts)
# check recon cache stays clean after a second run
with mock.patch.object(my_auditor, '_sleep', lambda *a: None):
my_auditor.run_once(zero_byte_fps=50)
with open(self.rcache) as fd:
self.assertEqual({
'object_auditor_stats_ZBF': {
'audit_time': 0,
'bytes_processed': 0,
'errors': 0,
'passes': 1,
'quarantined': 0,
'start_time': mock.ANY}},
json.load(fd))
def test_run_parallel_audit_once(self):
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(
dict(devices=self.devices, mount_check='false',
zero_byte_files_per_second=89, concurrency=2))
# ZBF pids are smaller than the normal-audit pids; this way we can
# return them first from our mocked os.wait().
#
# Also, ZBF pids are even and normal-audit pids are odd; this is so
# humans seeing this test fail can better tell what's happening.
forked_pids = []
next_zbf_pid = [2]
next_normal_pid = [1001]
outstanding_pids = [[]]
def fake_fork_child(**kwargs):
if len(forked_pids) > 10:
# something's gone horribly wrong; try not to hang the test
# run because of it
raise BaseException("forking too much")
if kwargs.get('zero_byte_fps'):
pid = next_zbf_pid[0]
next_zbf_pid[0] += 2
else:
pid = next_normal_pid[0]
next_normal_pid[0] += 2
outstanding_pids[0].append(pid)
forked_pids.append(pid)
return pid
def fake_os_wait():
if not outstanding_pids[0]:
raise BaseException("nobody waiting")
# ZBF auditor finishes first
outstanding_pids[0].sort()
pid = outstanding_pids[0].pop(0)
return (pid, 0) # (pid, status)
# make sure we've got enough devs that the ZBF auditor can finish
# before all the normal auditors have been started
mkdirs(os.path.join(self.devices, 'sdc'))
mkdirs(os.path.join(self.devices, 'sdd'))
with mock.patch("swift.obj.auditor.os.wait", fake_os_wait), \
mock.patch.object(my_auditor, 'fork_child', fake_fork_child), \
mock.patch.object(my_auditor, '_sleep', lambda *a: None):
my_auditor.run_once()
self.assertEqual(sorted(forked_pids), [2, 1001, 1003, 1005, 1007])
def test_run_parallel_audit_once_failed_fork(self):
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(
dict(devices=self.devices, mount_check='false',
concurrency=2))
start_pid = [1001]
outstanding_pids = []
failed_once = [False]
def failing_fork(**kwargs):
# this fork fails only on the 2nd call
# it's enough to cause the growth of orphaned child processes
if len(outstanding_pids) > 0 and not failed_once[0]:
failed_once[0] = True
raise OSError
start_pid[0] += 2
pid = start_pid[0]
outstanding_pids.append(pid)
return pid
def fake_wait():
return outstanding_pids.pop(0), 0
with mock.patch("swift.obj.auditor.os.wait", fake_wait), \
mock.patch.object(my_auditor, 'fork_child', failing_fork), \
mock.patch.object(my_auditor, '_sleep', lambda *a: None):
for i in range(3):
my_auditor.run_once()
self.assertEqual(len(outstanding_pids), 0,
"orphaned children left {0}, expected 0."
.format(outstanding_pids))
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
@patch_policies(_mocked_policies)
class TestAuditWatchers(TestAuditorBase):
def setUp(self):
super(TestAuditWatchers, self).setUp()
timestamp = Timestamp(time.time())
disk_file = self.df_mgr.get_diskfile(
'sda', '0', 'a', 'c', 'o0', policy=POLICIES.legacy)
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
data = b'0' * 1024
etag = md5()
with disk_file.create() as writer:
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
writer.write(data)
etag.update(data)
metadata = {
'ETag': etag.hexdigest(),
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
'X-Timestamp': timestamp.internal,
'Content-Length': str(len(data)),
'X-Object-Meta-Flavor': 'banana',
}
writer.put(metadata)
# The commit does nothing; we keep it for code copy-paste with EC.
writer.commit(timestamp)
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
disk_file = self.df_mgr.get_diskfile(
'sda', '0', 'a', 'c', 'o1', policy=POLICIES.legacy)
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
data = b'1' * 2048
etag = md5()
with disk_file.create() as writer:
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
writer.write(data)
etag.update(data)
metadata = {
'ETag': etag.hexdigest(),
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
'X-Timestamp': timestamp.internal,
'Content-Length': str(len(data)),
'X-Object-Meta-Flavor': 'orange',
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(timestamp)
frag_0 = self.disk_file_ec.policy.pyeclib_driver.encode(
b'x' * self.disk_file_ec.policy.ec_segment_size)[0]
etag = md5()
with self.disk_file_ec.create() as writer:
writer.write(frag_0)
etag.update(frag_0)
metadata = {
'ETag': etag.hexdigest(),
'X-Timestamp': timestamp.internal,
'Content-Length': str(len(frag_0)),
'X-Object-Meta-Flavor': 'peach',
'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Frag-Index': '1',
'X-Object-Sysmeta-Ec-Etag': 'fake-etag',
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(timestamp)
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
def test_watchers(self):
calls = []
class TestWatcher(object):
def __init__(self, conf, logger):
self._started = False
self._ended = False
calls.append(["__init__", conf, logger])
# Make sure the logger is capable of quacking like a logger
logger.debug("getting started")
def start(self, audit_type, **other_kwargs):
if self._started:
raise Exception("don't call it twice")
self._started = True
calls.append(['start', audit_type])
def see_object(self, object_metadata,
data_file_path, **other_kwargs):
calls.append(['see_object', object_metadata,
data_file_path, other_kwargs])
def end(self, **other_kwargs):
if self._ended:
raise Exception("don't call it twice")
self._ended = True
calls.append(['end'])
conf = self.conf.copy()
conf['watchers'] = 'test_watcher1'
conf['__file__'] = '/etc/swift/swift.conf'
ret_config = {'swift#dark_data': {'action': 'log'}}
with mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.parse_prefixed_conf',
return_value=ret_config), \
mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.load_pkg_resource',
side_effect=[TestWatcher]) as mock_load, \
mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.get_logger',
lambda *a, **kw: self.logger):
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(conf)
self.assertEqual(mock_load.mock_calls, [
mock.call('swift.object_audit_watcher', 'test_watcher1'),
])
my_auditor.run_audit(mode='once', zero_byte_fps=float("inf"))
self.assertEqual(len(calls), 6)
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
self.assertEqual(calls[0], ["__init__", conf, mock.ANY])
self.assertIsInstance(calls[0][2], PrefixLoggerAdapter)
self.assertIs(calls[0][2].logger, self.logger)
self.assertEqual(calls[1], ["start", "ZBF"])
self.assertEqual(calls[2][0], "see_object")
self.assertEqual(calls[3][0], "see_object")
# The order in which the auditor finds things on the filesystem is
# irrelevant; what matters is that it finds all the things.
calls[2:5] = sorted(calls[2:5], key=lambda item: item[1]['name'])
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
self._assertDictContainsSubset({'name': '/a/c/o0',
'X-Object-Meta-Flavor': 'banana'},
calls[2][1])
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
self.assertIn('node/sda/objects/0/', calls[2][2]) # data_file_path
self.assertTrue(calls[2][2].endswith('.data')) # data_file_path
self.assertEqual({}, calls[2][3])
self._assertDictContainsSubset({'name': '/a/c/o1',
'X-Object-Meta-Flavor': 'orange'},
calls[3][1])
self.assertIn('node/sda/objects/0/', calls[3][2]) # data_file_path
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
self.assertTrue(calls[3][2].endswith('.data')) # data_file_path
self.assertEqual({}, calls[3][3])
self._assertDictContainsSubset({'name': '/a/c_ec/o',
'X-Object-Meta-Flavor': 'peach'},
calls[4][1])
self.assertIn('node/sda/objects-2/0/', calls[4][2]) # data_file_path
self.assertTrue(calls[4][2].endswith('.data')) # data_file_path
self.assertEqual({}, calls[4][3])
self.assertEqual(calls[5], ["end"])
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
log_lines = self.logger.get_lines_for_level('debug')
self.assertIn(
"[audit-watcher test_watcher1] getting started",
log_lines)
def test_builtin_watchers(self):
# Yep, back-channel signaling in tests.
sentinel = 'DARK'
timestamp = Timestamp(time.time())
disk_file = self.df_mgr.get_diskfile(
'sda', '0', 'a', sentinel, 'o2', policy=POLICIES.legacy)
data = b'2' * 1024
etag = md5()
with disk_file.create() as writer:
writer.write(data)
etag.update(data)
metadata = {
'ETag': etag.hexdigest(),
'X-Timestamp': timestamp.internal,
'Content-Length': str(len(data)),
'X-Object-Meta-Flavor': 'mango',
}
writer.put(metadata)
writer.commit(timestamp)
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
def fake_direct_get_container(node, part, account, container,
prefix=None, limit=None):
self.assertEqual(part, 1)
self.assertEqual(limit, 1)
if container == sentinel:
return {}, []
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
# The returned entry is not abbreviated, but is full of nonsese.
entry = {'bytes': 30968411,
'hash': '60303f4122966fe5925f045eb52d1129',
'name': '%s' % prefix,
'content_type': 'video/mp4',
'last_modified': '2017-08-15T03:30:57.693210'}
return {}, [entry]
conf = self.conf.copy()
conf['watchers'] = 'test_watcher1'
conf['__file__'] = '/etc/swift/swift.conf'
# with default watcher config the DARK object will not be older than
# grace_age so will not be logged
ret_config = {'test_watcher1': {'action': 'log'}}
with mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.parse_prefixed_conf',
return_value=ret_config), \
mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.load_pkg_resource',
side_effect=[DarkDataWatcher]):
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(conf, logger=self.logger)
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
with mock.patch('swift.obj.watchers.dark_data.Ring', FakeRing1), \
mock.patch("swift.obj.watchers.dark_data.direct_get_container",
fake_direct_get_container):
my_auditor.run_audit(mode='once')
log_lines = self.logger.get_lines_for_level('info')
self.assertIn(
'[audit-watcher test_watcher1] total unknown 0 ok 4 dark 0',
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
log_lines)
self.logger.clear()
# with grace_age=0 the DARK object will be older than
# grace_age so will be logged
ret_config = {'test_watcher1': {'action': 'log', 'grace_age': '0'}}
with mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.parse_prefixed_conf',
return_value=ret_config), \
mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.load_pkg_resource',
side_effect=[DarkDataWatcher]):
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(conf, logger=self.logger)
with mock.patch('swift.obj.watchers.dark_data.Ring', FakeRing1), \
mock.patch("swift.obj.watchers.dark_data.direct_get_container",
fake_direct_get_container):
my_auditor.run_audit(mode='once')
log_lines = self.logger.get_lines_for_level('info')
self.assertIn(
'[audit-watcher test_watcher1] total unknown 0 ok 3 dark 1',
log_lines)
def test_dark_data_watcher_init(self):
conf = {}
with mock.patch('swift.obj.watchers.dark_data.Ring', FakeRing1):
watcher = DarkDataWatcher(conf, self.logger)
self.assertEqual(self.logger, watcher.logger)
self.assertEqual(604800, watcher.grace_age)
self.assertEqual('log', watcher.dark_data_policy)
conf = {'grace_age': 360, 'action': 'delete'}
with mock.patch('swift.obj.watchers.dark_data.Ring', FakeRing1):
watcher = DarkDataWatcher(conf, self.logger)
self.assertEqual(self.logger, watcher.logger)
self.assertEqual(360, watcher.grace_age)
self.assertEqual('delete', watcher.dark_data_policy)
conf = {'grace_age': 0, 'action': 'invalid'}
with mock.patch('swift.obj.watchers.dark_data.Ring', FakeRing1):
watcher = DarkDataWatcher(conf, self.logger)
self.assertEqual(self.logger, watcher.logger)
self.assertEqual(0, watcher.grace_age)
self.assertEqual('log', watcher.dark_data_policy)
def test_dark_data_agreement(self):
# The dark data watcher only sees an object as dark if all container
# servers in the ring reply without an error and return an empty
# listing. So, we have the following permutations for an object:
#
# Container Servers Result
# CS1 CS2
# Listed Listed Good - the baseline result
# Listed Error Good
# Listed Not listed Good
# Error Error Unknown - the baseline failure
# Not listed Error Unknown
# Not listed Not listed Dark - the only such result!
#
scenario = [
{'cr': ['L', 'L'], 'res': 'G'},
{'cr': ['L', 'E'], 'res': 'G'},
{'cr': ['L', 'N'], 'res': 'G'},
{'cr': ['E', 'E'], 'res': 'U'},
{'cr': ['N', 'E'], 'res': 'U'},
{'cr': ['N', 'N'], 'res': 'D'}]
conf = self.conf.copy()
conf['watchers'] = 'test_watcher1'
conf['__file__'] = '/etc/swift/swift.conf'
ret_config = {'test_watcher1': {'action': 'log', 'grace_age': '0'}}
with mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.parse_prefixed_conf',
return_value=ret_config), \
mock.patch('swift.obj.auditor.load_pkg_resource',
side_effect=[DarkDataWatcher]):
my_auditor = auditor.ObjectAuditor(conf, logger=self.logger)
for cur in scenario:
def fake_direct_get_container(node, part, account, container,
prefix=None, limit=None):
self.assertEqual(part, 1)
self.assertEqual(limit, 1)
reply_type = cur['cr'][int(node['id']) - 1]
if reply_type == 'E':
raise ClientException("Emulated container server error")
if reply_type == 'N':
return {}, []
entry = {'bytes': 30968411,
'hash': '60303f4122966fe5925f045eb52d1129',
'name': '%s' % prefix,
'content_type': 'video/mp4',
'last_modified': '2017-08-15T03:30:57.693210'}
return {}, [entry]
self.logger.clear()
namespace = 'swift.obj.watchers.dark_data.'
with mock.patch(namespace + 'Ring', FakeRing2), \
mock.patch(namespace + 'direct_get_container',
fake_direct_get_container):
my_auditor.run_audit(mode='once')
# We inherit a common setUp with 3 objects, so 3 everywhere.
if cur['res'] == 'U':
unk_exp, ok_exp, dark_exp = 3, 0, 0
elif cur['res'] == 'G':
unk_exp, ok_exp, dark_exp = 0, 3, 0
else:
unk_exp, ok_exp, dark_exp = 0, 0, 3
log_lines = self.logger.get_lines_for_level('info')
for line in log_lines:
if not line.startswith('[audit-watcher test_watcher1] total'):
continue
words = line.split()
if not (words[3] == 'unknown' and
words[5] == 'ok' and
words[7] == 'dark'):
unittest.TestCase.fail('Syntax error in %r' % (line,))
try:
unk_cnt = int(words[4])
ok_cnt = int(words[6])
dark_cnt = int(words[8])
except ValueError:
unittest.TestCase.fail('Bad value in %r' % (line,))
if unk_cnt != unk_exp or ok_cnt != ok_exp or dark_cnt != dark_exp:
fmt = 'Expected unknown %d ok %d dark %d, got %r, for nodes %r'
msg = fmt % (unk_exp, ok_exp, dark_exp,
' '.join(words[3:]), cur['cr'])
self.fail(msg=msg)
Let developers/operators add watchers to object audit Swift operators may find it useful to operate on each object in their cluster in some way. This commit provides them a way to hook into the object auditor with a simple, clearly-defined boundary so that they can iterate over their objects without additional disk IO. For example, a cluster operator may want to ensure a semantic consistency with all SLO segments accounted in their manifests, or locate objects that aren't in container listings. Now that Swift has encryption support, this could be used to locate unencrypted objects. The list goes on. This commit makes the auditor locate, via entry points, the watchers named in its config file. A watcher is a class with at least these four methods: __init__(self, conf, logger, **kwargs) start(self, audit_type, **kwargs) see_object(self, object_metadata, data_file_path, **kwargs) end(self, **kwargs) The auditor will call watcher.start(audit_type) at the start of an audit pass, watcher.see_object(...) for each object audited, and watcher.end() at the end of an audit pass. All method arguments are passed as keyword args. This version of the API is implemented on the context of the auditor itself, without spawning any additional processes. If the plugins are not working well -- hang, crash, or leak -- it's easier to debug them when there's no additional complication of processes that run by themselves. In addition, we include a reference implementation of plugin for the watcher API, as a help to plugin writers. Change-Id: I1be1faec53b2cdfaabf927598f1460e23c206b0a
2015-08-13 17:05:25 -05:00
2010-07-12 17:03:45 -05:00
if __name__ == '__main__':
unittest.main()